Many objects and events in the real world are complex and multidimensional. Different goals require that different judgments be made about these objects and events. In identification, every stimulus has its own unique response label, whereas in categorization many stimuli have the same label. Hence, there is a oneto-one stimulus-response mapping in identification and a manyto-one mapping in categorization. For example, one might ask whether the remains uncovered are those of the famous Himalayan climber George Mallory (identification) or whether they are from one of the many mountaineers who died on Mount Everest in the 1900s (categorization). Similarly, the forensic scientist might ask whether a blood splatter of Type O found at a crime scene was from the suspect (identification) or whether it was from one of the victims (categorization).
Learning and attentional processes play an important role in identification and categorization. For example, the forensic scientist must learn about the characteristics of blood splatters and must have extensive practice identifying and categorizing before being qualified to work for the local crime scene unit. Similarly, accurate identification and categorization involves determining which aspects of blood splatters are important to attend to and which aspects are not. A large body of empirical and theoretical research has been devoted to studying the relations between identification and categorization by having observers first learn to identify a set of stimuli and then perform several different categorization problems using the same stimuli (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Maddox, in press; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Nosofsky, 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 Nosofsky, , 1989 Shepard & Chang, 1963; Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961) .
LEARNING PROCESSES IN IDENTIFICATION-CATEGORIZATION
Although learning plays an important role in identification and categorization, no study has examined learning processes simultaneously in identification and categorization and only one study examined identification learning in the identification-categorization relationship (Nosofsky, 1987) . Nosofsky (1987) had a large group of observers perform three blocks of identification trials with 12 Munsell color chips that varied in saturation and brightness. The data were collapsed across observers separately for each block of trials. Nosofsky (1987) applied an exemplar-based, multidimensional scaling (MDS) model to the identification data. In this model, stimuli are represented as points in some multidimensional psychological space and similarity is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing function of interpoint distance. Nosofsky (1987) conceptualized the learning process as consisting of two components. One component was a discrimination-learning component that was modeled by assuming that discriminability in the psychological space increased across the three blocks of trials. A second component was a response-learning component that was modeled by assuming that guessing decreased across the three blocks of trials. As hypothesized, discriminability increased and guessing decreased across the three blocks of trials. Nosofsky (1987) argued that the change in discriminability was due to a change in memorial similarity, as opposed to perceptual similarity, because the stimuli were of high perceptual discriminability and the stimulus displays were response terminated. Although reasonable, this hypothesis is not testable because perceptual processes (e.g., perceptual confusability) and decisional processes (e.g., memorial similarity) are modeled by the same parameter in this model.
The current study attempted to determine whether the locus of learning effects in identification was on perceptual processes, decisional processes, or both by applying models based on Ashby and Townsend's (1986) general recognition theory (GRT). In GRT, perceptual processing parameters are distinct from decisional processing parameters. Two approaches were possible. One possibility was to follow Nosofsky (1987) and collect a small amount of data from a large number of observers and then average those data. The advantage of this approach is that early learning processes such as guessing strategies can be examined. The disadvantage is that averaging is known to alter the qualitative structure of the identification confusions by artificially increasing the symmetry in the confusion matrix (Ashby, Lee, & Balakrishnan, 1992; Ashby, Maddox, & Lee, 1994; Townsend & Landon, 1982) . Thus, the approach taken in this study was to collect a large amount of data from a few individuals. I took this approach to preclude a detailed examination of very early learning processes such as guessing strategies and to allow a detailed examination of long-term learning effects.
One study examined categorization learning in the identification-categorization relationship (Maddox, in press ). Because this study also focused on attention learning I review it in the next section.
ATTENTION PROCESSES IN IDENTIFICATION-CATEGORIZATION
In a series of studies, Nosofsky (1986 Nosofsky ( , 1987 Nosofsky ( , 1989 examined attentional processes in the identification-categorization relationship by applying an exemplar-based MDS model. Nosofsky predicted categorization performance from identification performance by assuming that the similarity relations among exemplars in the MDS psychological space were modified by the changing attentional demands across identification and categorization. Nosofsky focused on decisional selective attention and decisional integration categorization problems. In decisional selective attention, the ideal strategy is to set a criterion along one stimulus dimension and ignore the other. In decisional integration the ideal strategy is to attend to both stimulus dimensions. Nosofsky found that decisional selective attention categorization problems altered the similarity structure differently from decisional integration categorization problems (however, see Maddox & Ashby, 1998) . Unfortunately, this approach does not allow one to determine whether the changing attentional demands lead to changes in low-level perceptual processes, high-level decisional processes, or both. The ability to separate attentional effects on low-level perceptual processes from attentional effects on high-level decisional processes is critical given the growing body of research that suggests that the human attention system is served by separate subsystems: one perceptual and one decisional (e.g., Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Maddox, Ashby, & Waldron, 2000; Pashler, 1989 Pashler, , 1991 Pashler, , 1993 Posner, 1993; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, Sandson, Dhawan, & Shulman, 1989 ; model-based implementations of multiple attention systems can be found in Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) . The current thinking is that the perceptual attention system is mediated by posterior brain structures (e.g., visual cortex, much of posterior parietal cortex, the pulvinar, and the superior colliculus; Olshausen, Anderson, & Van Essen, 1993; Posner & Petersen, 1990 ) and the decisional attention system is mediated by anterior brain structures (e.g., anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and perhaps the basal ganglia and pulvinar; Ashby et al., 1998; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; LaBerge, 1995 LaBerge, , 1997 Posner & Petersen, 1990) .
Maddox (in press; see also Maddox & Bogdanov, 2000) examined the influence of perceptual and decisional attention processes on categorization and provided a preliminary investigation of categorization learning by applying GRT-based models to early and late training performance. The focus of Maddox's study was on the perceptual matching-identification and perceptual matching-categorization relationships. Even so, a small section was devoted to the identification-categorization relationship. Maddox found that decisional selective attention categorization problems alter both low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes whereas decisional integration categorization tasks alter only high-level decisional processes. The model parameters indicated that decisional selective attention generally decreased perceptual variability along the decisionally attended dimension, which is referred to as perceptual selective attention (Maddox & Ashby, 1998; . The magnitude of perceptual and decisional selective attention generally increased with learning.
These findings are suggestive but were followed up in the current study, which focused exclusively on the identificationcategorization relationship. Maddox (in press) examined a very coarse measure of learning by partitioning the data into one early and one late phase. The current study expanded this into four training phases. The additional training phases had several advantages. First, they allowed a more accurate specification of the time course of categorization learning. Second, they provided additional degrees of freedom that were useful for model-based analyses. For example, whereas Maddox (in press) modeled the data from each training phase separately, one focus of the current modeling endeavor was to model the data from each training phase simultaneously. This allowed a rigorous examination of the interplay between low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes across training phases and across qualitatively different categorization problems such as decisional selective attention and decisional integration. In line with the approach taken to study identification learning, a large amount of data was collected from a small number of individuals. As with identification data, averaging is known to alter the qualitative structure of categorization data (Estes, 1956; Maddox, 1999; Maddox & Ashby, 1998; Smith & Minda, 1998) .
To summarize, the overriding goal of this research was to examine learning processes simultaneously in identification and categorization. This has never been undertaken within the framework of a single study. The aim was to isolate and quantify the effects of identification and categorization learning on low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes.
The next section, GRT, briefly outlines the theory. The details of the theory can be found in numerous other articles (Ashby, 1992a; , 1994 Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Ashby et al., 2001; . The Identification-Categorization Experiment section introduces the experiment, and the General Method section details the experimental methods. The Results and Theoretical Analyses section follows, and then the General Discussion section provides a summary and discussion.
GRT
GRT is a generalization of signal-detection theory to stimuli that vary along multiple dimensions. Within the framework of GRT, low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes are separate and distinct.
Low-Level Perceptual Processes
GRT takes as its fundamental axiom that perceptual noise exists and assumes that a single multidimensional stimulus can be represented perceptually by a multivariate probability distribution (Ashby & Lee, 1993) . For a two-dimensional stimulus, a bivariate normal distribution is assumed to describe the set of percepts. A bivariate normal distribution is described by a mean and variance along each dimension, as well as a covariance term, x , y , 2 x , 2 y , cov xy , where the subscripts x and y denote the x-and y-axes. Figure 1a depicts hypothetical equal likelihood contours for nine stimuli constructed from the factorial combination of three levels along two dimensions, x and y. Two forms of perceptual interaction are important in GRT: perceptual independence (PI) and perceptual separability (PS). PI holds for a single stimulus if and only if the perceptual effects for Dimensions x and y are statistically independent (i.e., when cov xy ϭ 0 for bivariate normal distributions; see Ashby, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1991; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Perrin & Ashby, 1991 , for empirical tests of PI). All nine equal likelihood contours in Figure 1a satisfy PI. PS holds when the distribution of perceptual effects for a particular component is unaffected by the level of the other component. More formally, Dimension x is perceptually separable from Dimension y when g i1 (x) ϭ g i2 (x) ϭ . . . ϭ g in (x), where g ij (x) is the marginal perceptual distribution along Dimension x for the stimulus with Level i along Component A and Level j along Component B (see Ashby & Townsend, 1986 , for details). In Figure 1a , Dimension y is perceptually separable from Dimension x because the marginal distributions for each level along Dimension y are unaffected by the level along Dimension x. To see this, note that y , and 2 y are identical across levels of x for any given level of y. In Figure 1a , Dimension x is not perceptually separable from Dimension y. To see this, note that x , and 2 x are not identical across levels of y for any given level of x.
High-Level Decisional Processes
In GRT, the experienced observer learns to divide the perceptual space into response regions and assigns a response to each region. The partitions between response regions are called decision bounds. On each trial the observer determines the location of the perceptual effect and gives the response associated with that region of the perceptual space. Ashby and colleagues (Ashby et al., , 2001 Ashby & Waldron, 1999 ) offered a neuropsychological theory of this process as applied to vision. In short, the theory assumes that visual stimuli are represented perceptually in highlevel visual areas such as inferotemporal cortex (IT). It is well known that cells in the visual cortex (and for that matter cortical cells associated with all of the sensory modalities) project in a many-to-one fashion into the striatum (Arnauld, Jeantet, Arsaut, & Desmotes-Mainard, 1996; Chudler, Sugiyama, & Dong, 1995; Jog, Kubota, Connolly, Hillegaart, & Graybiel, 1999; J. Wickens, 1993) . It is assumed that a low-resolution map of the perceptual space is represented among these striatal units. As the observer gains experience with the task, each striatal unit becomes associated with a particular response. Thus, the striatum can be thought of as associating a response with a cluster of visual cortical cells. On each trial the observer computes the Euclidean distance between the perceptual effect and each unit and gives the response associated with the closest unit. This minimum-distance classification scheme results in response regions that are piecewise linear . Ashby and Waldron (1999) referred to this model as the striatal pattern classifier (SPC).
1 Hypothetical response regions and striatal units for the nine stimuli in Figure 1a are displayed in Figure 1b. 1 The importance of the striatum in categorization is also supported by the neuropsychological and animal literature. For example, patients with striatal damage, such as patients with Parkinson's or Huntington's disease, show deficits in categorization learning (e.g., Filoteo, Maddox, & Davis, in press; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Knowlton, Squire, Paulsen, Swerdlow, Swenson, & Butters, 1996; Maddox & Filoteo, 2001 ). In addition, caudate lesions in rats and monkeys disrupt the same form of learning (McDonald & White, 1993 , 1994 Packard, Hirsch, & White, 1989; Packard & McGaugh, 1992) . 
Perceptual and Decisional Attention Processes
Attentional processes are critical to an understanding of the identification-categorization relationship (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Nosofsky, 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 Nosofsky, , 1989 . Although perceptual and decisional attention effects are nonidentifiable in exemplar-based MDS models, in GRT perceptual attention processes affect the perceptual variances and decisional attention processes affect the response regions.
2 A great deal of research has focused on a particular form of attention, namely selective attention (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Goldstone, 1994; Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Maddox & Bogdanov, 2000; Nosofsky, 1986) . In GRT, perceptual selective attention results when the perceptual noise (or variance) along the attended dimension is reduced relative to the perceptual noise along the unattended dimension. The notion that attention reduces perceptual variability has a long history in signaldetection theory (Braida & Durlach, 1972; Durlach & Braida, 1969; Luce & Green, 1978; Luce & Nosofsky, 1984; Macmillan, Goldberg, & Braida, 1988) . Perceptual selective attention effects can vary in magnitude. Figure 2a displays hypothetical contours of equal likelihood for two stimuli in which there is equal perceptual attention to both dimensions. Figure 2b depicts a case in which there is weak perceptual selective attention to Dimension x, and Figure 2c depicts a strong perceptual selective attention to Dimension x. Note that as one goes from Figure 2a to 2b to 2c, the perceptual variability along Dimension x decreases relative to the perceptual variability along Dimension y, indicating an increase in the magnitude of perceptual selective attention. Perfect decisional selective attention results when the decision bound is parallel to one of the coordinate axes. Decisional selective attention is perfect under these conditions because the decision is determined by only the value along one dimension and is unaffected by the value along the other dimension. This is also referred to as "decisional separability" (Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 1992) . As the decision bound moves away from parallel, the magnitude of the decisional selective attention weakens. A weak decisional selective attention to Dimension x is depicted in Figure 2b by the brokenline decision bound, whereas a strong decisional selective attention to Dimension x is depicted in Figure 2c . An advantage of GRT is that perceptual and decisional selective attention can be quantified by examining the perceptual noise and decision bound parameters.
IDENTIFICATION-CATEGORIZATION EXPERIMENT
In this study four observers completed a large number of sessions in identification followed by a large number of sessions in decisional integration and decisional selective attention categorization conditions. The same stimulus ensemble was used in each task. Because the observers completed a large number of sessions in each task, the resulting data were quite stable and provided the necessary database for answering several important questions regarding low-and high-level psychological processes and how these are affected by learning and attention. The approach was to use GRT to first model the identification data and to test various hypotheses regarding the effects of learning on low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes. Learning was found to have a strong effect on high-level decisional processes and to have a much smaller effect on low-level perceptual processes. In light of this fact, the resulting low-level perceptual representation estimated from the identification data was then held 2 In the exemplar-based MDS model, the attention weight parameter, w, modifies the similarity relations among items in the psychological space and thus has a strong effect on the equal similarity contour that separates the psychological space into two regions: one in which the probability of responding "A" is greater than .5 and the other in which the probability is less than .5. Ashby and Perrin (1988; see also Maddox & Ashby, 1998) showed that the attention weight parameter is directly related to the perceptual variance parameters in a simple version of GRT in which the perceptual covariance matrices are identical across stimuli and in which perceptual independence is satisfied-constraints that were not satisfied in the current study. Thus, the attention weight parameter is most directly related to the perceptual form of attention postulated in GRT, although it is equivalent under only the very constrained perceptual representation assumptions described above. fixed (or modified systematically) in an attempt to simultaneously model categorization performance across four learning phases. Specifically, the categorization response frequencies for each stimulus and learning phase were predicted quantitatively from the identification task perceptual representation. One aim was to characterize and quantify the nature of categorization learning effects on low-level and high-level processes. In particular, a test of the hypothesis that decisional selective attention led to perceptual selective attention was performed by allowing the perceptual noise along the attended dimension to differ relative to the perceptual noise along the unattended dimension (see Results and Theoretical Analyses section for details).
General Method

Observers
Four observers were solicited from the university community and were paid for their participation. All observers had prior experience with similar experiments and stimuli. All observers had 20 -20 vision or vision corrected to 20 -20.
Stimuli
The same stimuli were used in all tasks. The stimulus set consisted of 16 dots. These stimuli represent a subset taken from 49 stimuli that were constructed from the factorial combination of seven levels of horizontal location with seven levels of vertical location. The seven horizontal locations (relative to the lower left corner of the computer monitor) were 499, 503, 507, 511, 515, 519, and 523 pixels. The seven vertical locations (relative to the lower left corner of the computer monitor) were 371, 375, 379, 383, 387, 391, and 395. The 16 stimuli and a numbering scheme are depicted in Figure 3a . Observers were seated approximately 40 in. (101.6 cm) from the computer screen, and each dot was presented in white on a black background. The stimuli were computer generated and displayed on a monitor with 1024 ϫ 768 resolution in a dimly lit room.
Procedure Identification Task
Each observer completed twenty 480-trial sessions in the identification experiment. On each trial, 1 of the 16 stimuli was selected at random with equal probability. The stimulus was presented for 100 ms and was followed by a 50 ϫ 50 pixel 2 white mask centered on the computer screen. The observer then pressed 1 of 16 response keys that were arranged in a diamond shape similar to that of the stimulus ensemble. The observer received a 500-ms corrective feedback display that denoted whether they were "correct" or "incorrect," along with the number associated with the correct response. This was followed by a 1,000-ms blank screen and initiation of the next trial.
Categorization Task
Each observer completed fifteen 600-trial sessions in each of three categorization tasks. On each trial, 1 of the 16 stimuli was selected at random with equal probability. The stimulus was presented for 100 ms and was followed by the mask. The observer gave a categorization response and received corrective feedback for 500 ms followed by a 1,000-ms blank screen and initiation of the next trial. All observers completed the decisional integration task first (see Figure 3b ). Each observer completed one of two versions of the horizontal decisional selective attention task and one of two versions of the vertical decisional selective attention task. The stimulus-to-category response mappings for these tasks are depicted in Figure 3c -3f. Throughout the data analyses, the two versions of each task were referred to simply as horizontal and vertical decisional selective tasks.
Results and Theoretical Analyses
Identification Experiment
A primary goal of this research was to examine learning processes in identification. Although guessing strategies and strategies for initial learning of the response mappings are of interest, they were not the focus of the current research. Rather, this research focused on long-term changes in processing that result from experience. In light of this fact, the first two sessions were considered as practice and were excluded from further analyses. Identification performance was divided into three training phases, early, middle, and late training, by generating a confusion matrix from the data collapsed across sessions 3-8, 9 -14, and 15-20, respectively. There is no a priori reason to assume that identification entails three phases of long-term learning, but a division into three phases was made for two practical reasons. First, it was important to include a large number of trials in each confusion matrix so that the resulting parameter estimates were relatively stable. Each confusion matrix contained nearly 3,000 identification trials. Second, each additional training phase increased the number of pa- rameters to be estimated and thus the time devoted to parameter estimation. In light of these considerations, three phases was deemed appropriate.
Accuracy Rates
Overall accuracy (percentage correct) for each observer and training phase are presented in Table 1 . Identification accuracy generally increased across training phases.
Model-Based Analyses
The preferred method of parameter estimation is maximum likelihood. Unfortunately, for technical reasons this is not possible in the current study and was not possible in other applications of GRT to identification confusions (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby et al., 2001; Maddox, in press; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . To estimate the probability of responding j when stimulus i is presented, one must integrate the stimulus i perceptual distribution over the response region assigned to j. Because bivariate normal distributions have a positive likelihood from minus to positive infinity, theoretically this probability can never be zero. However, when fitting GRT models, numerical integration is required. When the response j region is far from the stimulus i perceptual distribution, these numerical integration procedures will yield a predicted response probability equal to zero. Predicted probabilities equal to zero yield infinite fit values from the method of maximum likelihood. This problem could be alleviated by replacing predicted response probabilities of zero with some small value like .001 or .0001, but the specific value selected would change the fit value. Instead of selecting some arbitrary value, I chose to use another popular estimation method, namely the method of least squares. This was also the approach taken by previous researchers (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby et al., 2001; Maddox, in press; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) .
The models were fit to the data using an iterative search routine that minimized the sum of the squared errors between the predicted and observed frequencies for each of the 256 (16 ϫ 16) cells in each of the three confusion matrices. Because each confusion matrix contains 240 (15 ϫ 16) degrees of freedom, there were a total of 720 degrees of freedom in the data.
3 Several of the models have a nested structure and so it is possible to test whether the extra parameters of a more general model lead to a significant improvement in fit over the more restricted model. Let SSE r and SSE g denote the sum of squared error (SSE) for the restricted and more general model, respectively. In addition, let df r and df g denote the degrees of freedom in the data minus the degrees of freedom in the model for the restricted and general model, respectively. Then under the null hypothesis that the restricted model is the correct model, the statistic
has an approximately F distribution with df r Ϫ df g degrees of freedom in the numerator and df g degrees of freedom in the denominator (e.g., Khuri & Cornell, 1987) . 4 Before fitting the GRT models that examined learning processes in identification, a series of nested GRT models were applied separately to each learning phase to test some preliminary hypotheses regarding the nature of the perceptual representation. With respect to the perceptual representation, the goal was to determine whether PS and/or PI were satisfied in the data. In short, PI was strongly supported in all 12 cases (four observers with three confusion matrices each) and thus was assumed in all remaining model testing. The conclusions regarding PS were less clear. In some cases, PS appeared to hold, but in other cases there were violations. In light of this fact, the majority of the model-based analyses allowed for violations of PS. With respect to high-level decisional processes, the goal was to compare two versions of the SPC. Both versions assumed that a single striatal unit was associated with each stimulus. One, the SPC(fixed), assumed that the striatal units corresponded to the perceptual means and required no free parameters. The second, SPC(free), assumed that the striatal units were free parameters and required that the location of each be estimated from the data (requiring 32 parameters when applied to a single confusion matrix). In every case, the SPC(free) provided a significant improvement in fit over the SPC(fixed) and thus was assumed in the remaining model-based analyses.
Recall that the perceptual representation consists of 16 bivariate normal distributions, 1 for each stimulus. Each perceptual distribution contains a perceptual mean along each dimension and a perceptual variance along each dimension. Thus identification learning could affect the location of the perceptual means, the magnitude of the perceptual variances, or both simultaneously. Recall also that each identification response region is characterized by the location of an associated striatal unit. Thus, identification learning could affect the nature of the response regions by affecting the location of the striatal units.
To investigate learning processes in identification, eight versions of GRT were applied simultaneously to the early, middle, and late training phase confusion matrices. The assumptions of 3 A major problem in model fitting is to avoid local minima. Local minima result when the parameter estimation algorithm identifies a set of parameters that are locally superior (i.e., provide the best fit), but are not globally superior. Although one can never be certain that they have obtained the global minima, procedures should be followed to minimize this possibility. Along these lines, multiple starting parameter values were used. In addition, because many of the models were nested, the parameters from a more restricted model were used as starting values for a more general model. These procedures likely improve one's chances of identifying the global minima. 4 The results of this test must be interpreted with caution because it assumes that the confusion matrix frequencies are independent, which is likely not the case. Even so, Lee (1991, 1992) showed that these F tests generally agree with tests based on a maximum-likelihood approach that does not assume independence. A few comments are in order regarding the models. First, notice that the perceptual mean, perceptual variance, and striatal unit learning effect model each assumes a learning effect in only one of the three processes and each contains the same number of parameters. In addition, each of these models contains the no learning effect model as a special case. Second, notice that the perceptual mean-perceptual variance, perceptual mean-striatal unit, and perceptual variance-striatal unit learning effect models each assumes a learning effect in two of the three processes and each contains the same number of parameters. In addition, each of these models contains the perceptual mean, perceptual variance, and striatal unit learning effect model as well as the no learning effect model as a special case. Third, note that the all learning effects model contains the other seven models as special cases. Finally, it is worth stating explicitly that each model is identifiable from every other. Although this is obvious in some cases, it is less obvious in others. For example, on the surface it might appear that the perceptual mean and striatal unit learning effect models are nonidentifiable because both postulate location changes across training phases. To see that these are identifiable, consider the perceptual distributions and striatal units in Figure 1c . Suppose Stimulus A is in the lower left corner and Stimulus B is in the upper right corner. Shifting the perceptual mean associated with Stimulus A would change the probability of responding B on A trials, whereas shifting the striatal unit associated with Stimulus A would not. Note. Fixed implies that the parameters were freely estimated but were assumed to be constant across training phase. Free implies that the parameters were freely estimated separately for each training phase.
The number of free parameters, SSE, and percentage of variance accounted for by each model for each training phase (averaged across observers) are presented in Table 3 . (For now ignore the row labeled "Striatal unit [PS] .") I compared the three models that assumed a learning effect on only one of the three processes with the model that assumed no learning effect. The results were clear. Each of the three models that assumed a learning effect on one process provided a significant improvement in fit over the no learning effect model. Specifically, the no learning effect model was outperformed by the perceptual mean learning effect model, F(64, 564) ϭ 6. 85, 9.46, 16.13, and 22.20 Observers 1-4, respectively. Focusing on the three "single process" learning effect models, each with the same number of free parameters, note that the best fit was obtained with the striatal unit learning effect model, an intermediate level of fit was obtained with the perceptual mean learning effect model, and the worst fit was obtained with the perceptual variance learning effect model. This ordering also held for each individual training phase for every observer. Although it is possible that the performance differences across these three models are due to chance (see Golden, 2000 , for a discussion), it seems reasonable to draw the tentative conclusion that learning has a strong effect on the location of the striatal units, a weaker effect on the location of the perceptual means, and an even weaker (if any) effect on the magnitude of the perceptual variance. It is also worth mentioning that the performance improvement for the striatal unit learning effect model over the no learning effect model was substantial, resulting in an increase in percentage of variance accounted for ranging from 6.42%-8.25%.
To determine whether there was any evidence that learning simultaneously affects two of the three processes, we compared the three models that instantiate this possibility with the best of the single process models-namely, the striatal unit learning effect model. The striatal unit learning effect model, although containing fewer parameters, outperformed the perceptual mean-perceptual variance learning effect model. This superiority held at each individual training phase for every observer and provides strong evidence against the hypothesis that learning affects the perceptual means and perceptual variances although it leaves the striatal units unaffected. The perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model and the perceptual variance-striatal unit learning effect model contain the striatal unit learning effect model as a special case, and therefore F tests can be performed to determine whether the improvement in fit is statistically significant. For all four observers the perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model provided a significant improvement in fit over the striatal unit learning effect model, F(64, 500) ϭ 1.83, 2.56, 2.76, and 1.91, p Ͻ .01, for Observers 1-4, respectively. Even so, the improvement in predictive power as indexed by the percentage of variance accounted for was small, with the perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model providing less than a 1% increase on average. The perceptual variance-striatal unit learning effect model provided a significant improvement in fit ( p Ͻ .05) over the striatal unit learning effect model for Observers 2 and 3 only, F(64, 500) ϭ 0.78, 2.30, 3.33, and 1.34, for Observers 1-4, respectively.
Finally, I compared the striatal unit learning effect model and the perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model with the all learning effect model. F tests comparing the striatal unit learning effect model with the all learning effect model were significant at the p Ͻ .05 level for Observers 2 and 3 only, F(128, 436) ϭ 0.89, 1.71, 2.09, and 1.16, for Observers 1-4, respectively. The large improvement in fit for the striatal unit learning effect model over the no learning effect model and the much smaller improvement for the perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model and the all learning effect model over the striatal unit learning effect model can be seen quantitatively in Figure 4 . Figure 4 plots the average absolute deviation between the observed and predicted identification probabilities for these four models by training phase (averaged across observers). Notice that there is a large decrease in the deviation measure for the striatal unit learning effect model relative to the no learning effect model, whereas there is a much smaller decrease for the perceptual mean-striatal unit learning effect model and the all learning effect model relative to the striatal unit learning effect model. There is one interesting caveat though. The increase in predictive power for the all learning effect model was quite large late in training. Although speculative at this stage, this result suggests that the perceptual variances are affected by training but that considerable exposure to the task is required before the effect is observable. Clearly more work is needed in this area. Although one must be careful when comparing the fit values for models at the same level of the hierarchy (Golden, 2000) , these analyses do suggest that learning has a strong effect on the location of the striatal units. The effect on the perceptual means appears to be much smaller, and the effect on the perceptual variances (if any) does not result until the observer has extensive training with the task. In light of these findings, the remainder of the analyses focus on the striatal unit learning effect model.
The contours of equal likelihood that describe the perceptual representation from the striatal unit learning effect model for each observer are displayed in Figure 5 . Notice that the contours of equal likelihood are quite similar across observers. Notice also that for many stimuli, PS is nearly satisfied, even though this was not a constraint on the model. I explore this issue in detail shortly. To examine more closely the effect of learning on the location of the striatal units, I computed the distance between the striatal units and the associated mean perceptual effect for each stimulus. The median distance for early, middle, and late learning for each observer is presented in Table 4 . (For now ignore the row labeled "Striatal unit [PS] .") For all four observers the distance declined from early to late learning.
5 However, the decline was monotonically decreasing only for Observers 3 and 4. Thus, it appears that identification performance improved because the observers' striatal units approached the mean perceptual effect.
As Figure 5 suggests, PS was nearly satisfied in some cases. To test this possibility more formally, I applied a model like the striatal unit learning effect model, except that this new model assumed PS. This model is referred to as the striatal unit (PS) learning effect model. To determine whether violations of PS provided a significant improvement in fit, I compared the striatal unit learning effect model with the striatal unit (PS) learning effect model using F tests. The results were mixed. The PS model was supported for Observer 1, but was rejected in favor of the more general model for Observer 2-4, although the effect was especially prominent for Observers 3 and 4, F(36, 564) ϭ 1.27, 3.32, 6.44, and 8.60, for Observers 1-4, respectively. Even so, the SSE improvement was relatively small (ranging from 1.05 to 1.55 times larger for the striatal unit [PS] learning effect model), and the improvement in percentage of variance was also relatively small (ranging from 0.25% to 1.32% more variance in the data for the striatal unit learning effect model). Table 4 presents the median distance between the SPC striatal units and the mean perceptual effect for each stimulus for early, middle, and late learning by observer for the striatal unit (PS) learning effect model. The results are similar to those for the striatal unit learning effect model, with all observers showing a decline in the distance from early to late 5 The same pattern held for Observers 1 and 3 when average distance was computed. For Observers 2 and 4, there was one large distance that strongly affected the average. With that outlier removed, average distance decreased across learning for Observers 2 and 4. learning but only two observers showing a monotonic decline across learning phases. On the basis of these data it is difficult to determine whether PS is truly violated or whether PS is satisfied. Even so, any violations of PS appear to be small.
Brief Summary
The analyses presented in this section represent an attempt to isolate the effects of learning in identification. The approach was to postulate reasonable low-level perceptual representation effects and reasonable high-level decisional process effects and to compare the two. A model that assumed that (a) the perceptual representation remained unchanged across training phases and (b) the location of striatal units was affected by the training phase provided a good description of the data, accounting for 97%-98% of the variance in the data. With experience, the observer's striatal units approached the means of the perceptual distributions leading to improved performance. Although on the surface a model with 156 parameters may seem overly complex, it is important to note that the model was applied to data that contained 720 degrees of freedom. In addition, it is important to note that this model had relatively few free parameters as compared with the benchmark model of identification, namely the Luce-Shepard similarity (biased) choice model (see Luce, 1963; Shepard, 1957; Townsend, 1971; Townsend & Ashby, 1982; Townsend, Hu, & Ashby, 1981, for details) .
Next I attempted to model the categorization data from the low-level perceptual representation estimated from identification. Much like the analyses in this section, the approach was to test several hypotheses regarding the effects of categorization on lowlevel perceptual and high-level decisional processes.
Categorization Experiment
A primary goal of this research was to examine learning processes in categorization. The same considerations that went into selecting the identification training phases went into selecting the categorization training phases. Because initial guessing strategies were not of interest, the first session of each categorization task was considered as practice and was excluded from further analyses. To ensure a reasonable number of trials in each training phase and to keep the number of parameters to a reasonable amount, the data were divided into four 3.5-session blocks.
Accuracy Rates
The accuracy rates for each observer and categorization condition by training phase are presented in Table 5 . Performance generally improved over training blocks, although this was not always the case.
Model-Based Analyses
The data to be modeled were the observed response frequencies (for Categories A and B) for each of the 16 stimuli in each of three categorization conditions and four learning phases, which resulted in 192 degrees of freedom in the data. The technical difficulties that precluded the use of maximum-likelihood estimation in identification are not present in categorization, so maximum-likelihood procedures were used (Ashby, 1992b; T. D. Wickens, 1982) .
To investigate learning processes in categorization, four versions of GRT were applied simultaneously to the data from the four training phases. The assumptions of each model are summarized in the columns of Table 6 . The assumptions made by each model regarding the effects of training on the perceptual representation and decisional processes are summarized in the rows of Table 6 .
Low-level perceptual representation assumptions. The lowlevel perceptual representation derived from the identification data was assumed to be the correct perceptual representation for categorization (see Figure 5 ). Two hypotheses regarding the effects of learning on the nature of this perceptual representation were examined. One assumed that learning affects the perceptual representation in the decisional selective attention conditions, whereas the other assumed that learning affects the perceptual representation in the decisional integration condition. The perceptual selective attention (PSA) hypothesis implies that decisional selective attention tasks reduce the perceptual variances along the attended dimension relative to the perceptual variances along the unattended dimension. To model this "specific" change in the perceptual representation, one additive scalar was applied to the perceptual variance along the relevant dimension (i.e., the horizontal dimension in the horizontal decisional selective attention condition and the vertical dimension in the vertical decisional selective attention condition) and another additive scalar was applied to the perceptual variance along the irrelevant dimension (i.e., the vertical dimension in the horizontal decisional selective attention condition and the horizontal dimension in the vertical decisional selective attention condition). Specifically, the perceptual variance along the relevant and irrelevant dimensions, Note. DI ϭ decisional integration; DSA-H ϭ decisional selective attention to horizontal location; DSA-V ϭ decisional selective attention to vertical location.
⌬ irrel for each of the four training phases; two scalars total) was compared with a model that assumed changes across the four training phases (i.e., a different ⌬ rel and ⌬ irrel for each of the four training phases; eight scalars total). The decisional integration representation (DIR) hypothesis implies that decisional integration tasks are associated with a "general" change to the perceptual representation. By a general change I mean only that the perceptual variance along each dimension might be scaled by a fixed amount. To model this general change in the perceptual representation, one additive scalar was applied to the horizontal location variance and a second was applied to the vertical location variance. Specifically, the perceptual variance along the horizontal and vertical dimensions, Notice that the global structure of the perceptual representation (e.g., the perceptual means, perceptual correlations, and the overall relations among perceptual noise values) remained unchanged in the DIR hypothesis, whereas global changes do occur in the PSA hypothesis. To determine whether learning affected the decisional integration perceptual representation, a model that assumed no change across the four training phases (i.e., the same ⌬ h and ⌬ v for each of the four training phases; two scalars total) was compared with a model that assumed changes across the four training phases (i.e., a different ⌬ h and ⌬ v for each of the four training phases; eight scalars total).
High-level decisional process assumptions. Decision bound models of categorization, derived from GRT, were applied to examine the observer's decisional processes (Ashby, 1992a; . Both linear and quadratic decision bound models were investigated. Quadratic decision bounds did not provide a significant improvement in fit and are not discussed further. In addition, models that assumed no change in the decision bound parameters across training phase were compared with models that assumed changes across training. In line with a large body of research from traditional categorization studies, the decision bound parameters were found to change across training phases (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1990 Maddox, 1995; Maddox & Bohil, 1998a , 1998b , 2000 McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996) . Thus, I focus on only these models.
Decision bound models predict that responding will appear probabilistic because of perceptual noise and because of trial-bytrial fluctuations in the memory for the location of the decision bounds. With linear decision bounds, criterial noise (assumed to be univariate normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of 2 c ) is not identifiable from perceptual noise unless criterial noise is assumed to be constant across more than one condition Maddox & Bogdanov, 2000) . Because the PSA and DIR hypotheses described above measure changes in perceptual processes (i.e., perceptual variance changes), it is important that one obtain a separate and unique estimate of criterial noise. At least two approaches are possible. One approach is to yoke the criterial noise parameter and thus assume that it is constant across all three categorization conditions. Although this would make criterial noise identifiable, the main disadvantage of this approach is that the magnitude of criterial noise is generally different in decisional selective attention and decisional integration conditions (e.g., . A second approach, the one taken in this study, is to yoke the criterial noise parameter across the two decisional selective attention conditions and to assume that the criterial noise in the decisional integration condition was zero. This approach allows one to separate the perceptual selective attention effect outlined above from criterial noise. However, this approach precludes one from making strong claims about the effects of decisional integration on the nature of the low-level perceptual representation, because the scalars that estimate the general change in the lowlevel perceptual representation will also be influenced by the magnitude of criterial noise.
To summarize, the four models and their assumptions are as follows.
1. No PSA-No DIR learning effect model. This model assumes no learning effect on perceptual selective attention and no learning effect on the decisional integration representation. In other words, the same ⌬ rel , ⌬ irrel , ⌬ h , and ⌬ v scalars are used for each of the four training phases (4 scalars total).
2. PSA learning effect model. This model assumes a learning effect on perceptual selective attention and no learning effect on the decisional integration representation. In other words, different ⌬ rel and ⌬ irrel scalars are used for each of the four training phases but the same ⌬ h and ⌬ v scalars for each of the four training phases (10 scalars total).
3. DIR learning effect model. This model assumes no learning effect on perceptual selective attention and a learning effect on the decisional integration representation. In other words, the same ⌬ rel and ⌬ irrel scalars are used for each of the four training phases but different ⌬ h and ⌬ v scalars for each of the four training phases (10 scalars total).
4. PSA-DIR learning effect model. This model assumes a learning effect on perceptual selective attention and a learning effect on the decisional integration representation. In other words, different ⌬ rel , ⌬ irrel , ⌬ h , and ⌬ v scalars are used for each of the four training phases (16 scalars total).
A few additional comments are in order. First, all four models assume linear decision bounds that vary across the four training phases. Second, the PSA and DIR learning effect models contain the same number of parameters. Third, all models that assume some learning effect on the perceptual representation also assume Note. Fixed implies that the parameters were freely estimated but were assumed to be constant across training phase. Free implies that the parameters were freely estimated separately for each training phase. The DI criterial noise parameter value was fixed at zero. PSA ϭ perceptual selective attention; DIR ϭ decisional integration representation; DI ϭ decisional integration; DSA ϭ decisional selective attention.
a learning effect on the criterial noise parameter (i.e., all but the No PSA-No DIR learning effect model). Finally, the PSA and DIR learning effect models contain the No PSA-No DIR learning effect model as a special case and the PSA-DIR learning effect model contains the other three models as special cases. Thus, nested model-testing procedures based on the G 2 test can be used to determine the most parsimonious model for each data set.
The number of free parameters and goodness of fit for each model by condition and training phase (averaged across observers) are presented in Table 7 .05) , although the observed G 2 value of 16.89 was only slightly smaller than the critical value of 16.92. Even so, the performance improvement held for only one observer at the individual observer level. The PSA learning effect model provided a better account of the data on average and from three of the four observers than did the DIR learning effect model, despite the fact that both models contain the same number of free parameters. Even so, it is worth noting that the DIR learning effect model provided a consistently better account of the data from the decisional integration condition than did the PSA learning effect model, whereas the PSA learning effect model provided a consistently better account of the data from the decisional selective attention to horizontal location and Note. ϪLnL ϭ negative log likelihood; PSA ϭ perceptual selective attention; DIR ϭ decisional integration representation; DI ϭ decisional integration; DSA-H ϭ decisional selective attention to horizontal location; DSA-V ϭ decisional selective attention to vertical location.
decisional selective attention to vertical location conditions than did the DIR learning effect model. Clearly, the fits of both models were good and were similar enough that it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion regarding the superiority of one model over the other (Golden, 2000) . Finally, the PSA-DIR learning effect model was not superior to the PSA learning effect model on the basis of a G 2 test of the average fit values ( p Ͼ .05). This pattern also held for three of the four observers, and for the fourth the PSA-DIR learning effect model was superior at the p Ͻ .05 level but not at the p Ͻ .01 level.
Taken together, these results suggest that (in general) the learning effect was on the decision bounds and on the magnitude of perceptual selective attention. Even so, the predictions of all of the models were quite good as suggested by Figure 6 , which plots the average absolute deviation between the observed and predicted categorization probabilities for these four models by training phase (averaged across observers).
At this point a more detailed examination of the PSA learning effect model parameters is in order.
6 To determine whether the magnitude of perceptual and decisional selective attention increased across training phases, I examined the perceptual selective attention scalar values (i.e., the ⌬ rel and ⌬ irrel values) and the slope of the decisional selective attention decision bounds. Table 8 displays the perceptual attention scalar values for the relevant and irrelevant dimensions by training phase (averaged across observers). In support of the perceptual selective attention hypothesis, the scalar along the relevant dimension was smaller than the scalar along the irrelevant dimension. This held for the average and in 14 of 16 cases (4 Observers ϫ 4 Learning Phases) at the individual observer level. In addition, the difference between these values generally increased across training phases. This held for the average and for 3 of the 4 observers.
7 Table 9 displays the deviation from perfect decisional selective attention (in slope units) for each training phase averaged across observers. The decisional selective attention deviations decreased across training phases. This held for the average and for 3 of the 4 observers. The slope of the decision bound used in the decisional integration condition was also examined to determine whether it approached the experimenter-defined slope of Ϫ1. The results were similar to those for the decisional selective attention conditions, although to a smaller magnitude, with the deviation decreasing across training phases. (Deviations averaged across observers were as follows: 0. 23, 0.22, 0.19, and 0.20, for training phases 1-4, respectively.) For completeness, a few comments are in order regarding the DIR learning effect model parameters. To determine if the magnitude of the decisional integration scalars changed across training phases, I examined the ⌬ h and ⌬ v values. For 3 of the 4 observers the ⌬ h value was smaller during Training Phase 4 than during Training Phase 1, whereas the same pattern held for only 1 observer with respect to the ⌬ v value. However, the sum, ⌬ h ϩ ⌬ v declined monotonically from Training Phase 1 to 4 on average and was smaller during Phase 4 than Phase 1 for 3 of the 4 observers. The slope of the decision bound used in the decisional integration condition was also examined to determine whether it approached the experimenter-defined slope of Ϫ1. The results were similar to those from the PSA learning effect model with the deviation decreasing across training phases. (Deviations averaged across observers were as follows: 0.23, 0.21, 0.20, and 0.22, for training phases 1-4, respectively.) Finally, the deviation from perfect decisional selective attention (averaged across observers) declined monotonically from 0.25 during Phase 1 to 0.14 during Phase 4. These values are in line with those from the PSA learning effect model.
Brief Summary
The analyses presented in this section represent an attempt to account quantitatively for learning effects in the data from a number of categorization conditions from an initial low-level perceptual representation derived from identification data. Assumptions regarding learning effects on high-level decisional processes and low-level perceptual processes were examined. Two general comments are in order. First, there was strong evidence that learning affected high-level decisional processes leading to the 6 It is possible that the PSA model was supported over the DIR model because the model-based analyses assumed that the psychological dimensions were horizontal and vertical location. Perhaps the psychological dimensions were different. In fact, a 45°rotation would be reasonable in the dimensional integration condition, effectively making this a decisional selective attention condition. Although clearly a possibility, there are at least two reasons to believe that horizontal and vertical location were the appropriate dimensions. First, if observers were processing in a rotated space instead of in the horizontal-vertical space, then large perceptual dependencies should have been observed in the identification perceptual representation. In other words, if perceptual variability was really along the rotated dimensions this would reveal itself in the horizontal-vertical space as large perceptual dependencies. Yet perceptual independence was satisfied for all four observers. Second, to test the hypothesis that the observer used a rotated space in only the dimensional integration condition, a model was developed that assumed that the dimensional integration additive scalars apply in the rotated space. This model provided a reasonable account of the data, but in no case did it outperform the model that assumed that the dimensional integration scalars operated in the horizontal-vertical space.
7 Although the yoking procedure makes the perceptual selective attention scalar values identifiable from criterial noise, parameter dependencies can still emerge in the actual model fits. To determine whether dependencies existed in the current data, I computed correlation coefficients between the relevant, irrelevant, and irrelevant minus relevant perceptual selective attention scalar values and the criterial noise values. The correlation coefficients were .01, Ϫ.12, and Ϫ.12, respectively. None of these approached statistical significance. use of decision bounds that were more nearly optimal. Second, tasks that required decisional selective attention led to a form of perceptual selective attention in which the perceptual noise along the relevant dimension decreased relative to the perceptual noise along the irrelevant dimension. In addition, the magnitude of this perceptual selective attention effect increased with training.
General Discussion
An important goal of psychological inquiry is to predict task performance under a wide variety of conditions from the physical properties of the stimulus and the specifics of the task. To achieve this goal requires knowledge of low-level perceptual processes and high-level decisional processes and an understanding of how learning and attentional processes operate at each level. The importance of separating low-level perceptual processes (with their probabilistic nature) from high-level decisional processes in predicting performance in simple tasks such as unidimensional detection has been well known since the early days of signal-detection theory (for a review, see Green & Swets, 1967) . However, the importance of this distinction has been less well understood in predicting performance in more complex tasks such as identification and categorization. With few exceptions, the most common approach has been to essentially ignore perceptual processes or to make overly simplified low-level perceptual processing assumptions. For example, some of the most popular theories of categorization assume that each stimulus can be represented by a point in some multidimensional psychological space (Nosofsky, 1986) or by a set of binary-valued features (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) . Although these assumptions might be adequate for representing artificial stimuli such as symptom lists or schematic illustrations, they provide an inadequate model of perceptual processing for realworld stimuli that are nearly all continuous valued and are characterized by noisy perceptual effects (Geisler, 1989; Geisler & Albrecht, 1997) . Although one might argue that a single dot on a computer display does not constitute a real-world object, at some level of visual processing, dot arrays form the basis for complex visual perception. In fact, all objects are represented initially by a spatial array of photoreceptor activations (Geisler, 1989) . In addition, many current theories treat attention as a unitary process (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) and have been slow to incorporate findings from the neuroscience literature that suggest separate perceptual and decisional attention systems (Johnston et al., 1995; Pashler, 1989 Pashler, , 1991 Pashler, , 1993 Pashler, , 1998 Posner, 1993; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner et al., 1989) .
The current study alleviates these problems by applying general recognition theory to identification and categorization performance. GRT assumes a probabilistic low-level perceptual representation and high-level decisional processes that are motivated by the neuroscience literature (for a review see, e.g., Ashby et al., 1998 Ashby et al., , 2001 Ashby & Waldron, 1999) . In addition, GRT incorporates two separate attentional systems, an anterior (decisional) attention system and a posterior (perceptual) attention system, as suggested by the attention literature (for a review, see Pashler, 1998; Posner & Petersen, 1990) . The approach was to investigate learning and attentional processes in identification and categorization by instantiating and testing a number of hypotheses within the framework of GRT.
In a previous study, Nosofsky (1987) examined the effects of learning on performance in an identification task. Nosofsky applied an exemplar-based MDS model to the identification data. Nosofsky found that discriminability in the MDS space increased with experience, leading to better differentiation of similar stimuli. Although low-level perceptual processes are not identifiable from high-level decisional processes in this model, Nosofsky (1987) argued that learning affected memorial similarity, and not perceptual similarity because the stimuli were not perceptually confusable. In the current study, perceptual confusability was high and thus a rigorous test of learning effects on low-and high-level processes was possible. Three main hypotheses were tested. One assumed that learning leads to greater perceptual discriminability by increasing the separation of the perceptual means. The second assumed that learning leads to greater perceptual discriminability by reducing perceptual noise. The third assumed that learning affects the location of the striatal units leading to a change in the nature of the response regions. A model-based instantiation of the hypothesis that learning affects the location of the striatal units provided the largest improvement in fit over a model-based instantiation of the hypothesis that learning had no effect, although a modest improvement in fit was also observed for a model-based instantiation of the hypothesis that learning affects the perceptual means. Much less evidence was obtained for the hypothesis that learning affects the perceptual variances, although changes in the perceptual variances did appear to emerge after extensive training.
The high-level decisional processes were derived from Ashby and colleagues' SPC model (Ashby et al., 2001 ; see also Ashby & Waldron, 1999 ; for related models without a neuropsychological underpinning, see Anderson, 1991; Kruschke, 1992; Vandierendonck, 1995) . The SPC assumes that stimuli are represented perceptually in higher level visual areas such as IT. Because there is an approximately 10,000-to-1 mapping of IT cells onto cells in the striatum (J. Wickens, 1993) , it is assumed that a low-resolution map of the perceptual space is represented among these striatal units. Over trials the striatal units become associated with a particular response. In the current study, the striatal unit for each stimulus was found to converge toward its associated perceptual mean with learning (i.e., across early, middle, and late training). Thus, the response regions were fine-tuned so that they became more nearly centered on the appropriate perceptual distribution. The low-level perceptual representation derived from the identification data was held fixed in an attempt to quantitatively predict response probabilities from three categorization tasks. In two of the tasks, the experimenter-defined decision strategy (i.e., decisional selective attention) was to place all weight in the decision on one aspect of the stimulus while ignoring the other. In the other task, the experimenter-defined decision strategy (i.e., decisional integration) was to place equal weight in the decision on each stimulus dimension. As expected, learning affected high-level decisional processes and led to the use of decision strategies that became more like those defined by the experimenter. Hypotheses regarding the potential influence of learning and attentional processes on the nature of the low-level perceptual representation were also examined. Learning effects were tested by comparing models that assumed no learning effect on the low-level perceptual representation with models that assumed changes in the low-level perceptual representation across learning phases. Hypotheses regarding learning effects were combined factorially with two hypotheses regarding attentional effects on the low-level perceptual representation. One hypothesis implies that decisional selective attention tasks alter the low-level perceptual representation in such a way that the perceptual noise along the relevant dimension is reduced relative to the perceptual noise along the irrelevant dimension. A second hypothesis implies that decisional integration tasks alter the nature of the low-level perceptual representation. The results were mixed, but there was general support for the notion that decisional selective attention leads to perceptual selective attention and that the magnitude of the perceptual selective attention effect increases with learning. On the other hand, there was less support for the hypothesis that decisional integration tasks change the perceptual representation as learning progresses.
In this study, accurate identification and accurate decisional integration required the observer to attend to both aspects of the stimulus. Accurate decisional selective attention, on the other hand, can be obtained by ignoring one aspect of the stimulus. In all three tasks (identification, decisional selective attention, and decisional integration), it appears that high-level decisional processes become more efficient with learning. Specifically, the response regions in identification became more nearly centered on their appropriate perceptual distributions and the response regions in categorization approach the experimenter-defined response regions. However, the low-level perceptual representation remains constant across learning (or changed to a lesser degree) when both aspects of the stimulus are relevant to the task (i.e., in identification and decisional integration). Only when one aspect of the stimulus is irrelevant to the task does the low-level perceptual representation change systematically (i.e., in decisional selective attention). Under these conditions, the perceptual noise along the relevant dimension is reduced relative to the perceptual noise along the irrelevant dimension. This difference in the effects of task demand on perceptual attention may be due to the fact that perceptual attention is limited capacity. When both dimensions are relevant, perceptual attention must be allocated to each dimension; however, when only one dimension is relevant the observer can allocate more perceptual attention to the relevant dimension at the expense of perceptual processing along the irrelevant dimension. The fact that this occurs only when the decision problem allows suggests that the decrease in perceptual variance is the result of increased controlled attention to a perceptual dimension.
In conclusion, this study applied a unified theoretical framework, GRT, to the study of learning and attention processes in the identification-categorization relationship. GRT separates lowlevel perceptual processes from high-level decisional processes and acknowledges the existence of two separate attentional systems: one perceptual and one decisional. Good accounts of the identification and categorization data were obtained from a lowlevel perceptual representation derived from the identification data and a simple high-level decisional process that assumes a striatalbased, low-resolution map of the perceptual space is partitioned into separate response regions (Ashby et al, 2001; Ashby & Waldron, 1999) . In identification and categorization, learning affected high-level decisional processes leading to more nearly optimal response regions. Learning had a lesser effect on low-level perceptual processes when both stimulus dimensions were relevant for solving the task, as in identification and decisional integration categorization tasks, but a form of perceptual selective attention that increased in magnitude was observed in decisional selective attention tasks.
